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NOTES
ZONING AND NONZONING REGULATION UNDER THE

POLICE POWER

Introduction
The growth of zoning and nonzoning regulatory ordinances has
been phenomenal in the last twenty-five years. Both types of regulation derive their existence from the police power of the United
States Constitution. However, zoning ordinances undertake primarily
to direct the future growth of the municipality,' whereas nonzoning
regulatory legislation is based upon that branch of the
2 police power
which deals directly with the public health and safety.
Prior to the enactment of nonzoning regulatory ordinances the
common-law nuisance action was often employed where a tangible
harm threatened the community. 3 Nonzoning regulatory legislation
has not only encompassed within its scope many situations which

would be considered nuisances in law or in fact but has been extended
to many situations where the nuisance doctrine would not apply, yet
where there exists a threat of tangible harm or noxious use, whether
in the present or future, to the public health, safety, and welfare.
Although both types of ordinances, when exercised reasonably
and for the public good, have been upheld in most cases, a problem
usually arises when they purport to prohibit a business or use of the
the power of
land. Here the line between the police power and
4
eminent domain becomes almost indistinguishable.
I Zoning is that phase of the police power "which in the interests of the
general welfare permits a city to so limit the class of structures which can
be erected and the kind of business which can be maintained within various
areas or zones as to regulate and control the future growth and development
of the city." Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528, 531
(9th cir.), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931). The constitutionality of comprehensive zoning as a legitimate exercise of the police power was initially
upheld in the celebrated case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365 (1926).
2 For the purposes of the logical formation of this article an attempt was
made to separate the two classes of police power legislation, the determinant
being the primary purpose for which the ordinance was enacted. If town
growth and future community planning were the primary purpose of a particular ordinance, it was categorized as a zoning ordinance. If the primary
purpose was protection of the community against some tangible harm, then
the ordinance was placed in the category of nonzoning regulatory legislation.
See Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 189 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
3 "The common law's control over the use of land in the hands of private
owners was largely embodied in, and limited by, the doctrine of nuisance."
Note, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1261 (1957). "The law of nuisance, however, was
inadequate to take care of all the exigencies that arose in zoning development
and the courts were driven to such an elasticity of definition of the uses that
could be declared nuisances that the term lost all meaning as a practical measure
See also
of legislative power." Comment, 39 YALE L.J. 735, 738 (1930).
Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 457, 459 (1941).
.A very important distinction between the police power and the power of
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In what instances the ordinance in question will be upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power, and in what instances it will be
struck down as being confiscatory, is a question of degree and can
only be determined by application of the ordinance to a particular set
of facts.
Several problems loom large in this area. May the legislature
prohibit the carrying on of a beneficial business or use of land because that land falls within the purview of a comprehensive zoning
plan? What effect, if any, does the nonconforming use have on such
regulation? Further, may the legislature expressly prohibit the continuation of a vested business interest because it deems that interest
to be detrimental to public health and safety? May it accomplish this
same result by regulations which are so stringent in their effect as
to constitute a practical prohibition? What standards are applied to
determine the reasonableness of these ordinances? In the succeeding
paragraphs an attempt shall be made to discuss and to answer these
questions.
The Police Power Defined
5
Any definition of the police power must necessarily be nebulous.
One writer has summarized it thusly:

[I]t is clear that the police power has been developed by the legislatures
and approved by the courts until it now extends to the protection of public
health, safety, order, morals, conservation and development of natural resources, increasing industries, wealth, prosperity, and the promotion of public
convenience. In short, it may now be used for all public needs and the greatest
welfare.6
The futility of attempting to define this most limitless of all govern-

mental powers arises primarily because it is undergoing a continuous
process of evolution to meet the needs of the times.7 Of necessity,
therefore, it must be free from burdensome restrictions. However,
this power must never be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.8 To
insure reasonable application the ordinances are always subject to
eminent domain is that regulation under police power requires no compensation
to be rendered although valuable individual rights may be greatly restricted.
Where land is taken for the public good under the power of eminent domain,
however, compensation must be rendered. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61
Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 85 (1851).
5"This power is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any
very exact definition or limitation." See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 8Wall.) 36, 62 (1872).
Young, City Planning and Restrictions o the Use of Property, 9 MiNN.
L. Rxv. 593, 598 (1925).
7 People ex rel. St. Albans-Springfield Corp. v. Cornell, 257 N.Y. 73, 177

N.E. 313 (1931).

8 Ibid. "If we assume that the restraint may be permitted, the interference
must be not unreasonable, but on the contrary must be kept within the limits
of necessity." Id. at 83, 177 N.E. at 316.
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judicial scrutiny; 9 although a law itself may be reasonable by virtue
of its over-all effects, when applied to a particular situation it may be
held unreasonable and arbitrary. However, since all such laws under
the police power are presumptively valid, the burden is on the aggrieved property owner to show that the regulation as applied to him
was not justified by any reasonable interpretation of the facts. 10 And
in reviewing an exercise of this power, the function of the courts is
not to investigate the merits of a legislative decision-the wisdom of
such prohibitions and restrictions being a matter of legislative determination; thus, even though a court may not agree with that determination, it will not substitute its judgment for that of the authorities
if there is any reasonable justification for their action.'1 Before a
court can pronounce such an ordinance unconstitutional, it must be
clear that there is no extant tangible harm to protect against or that
there is no reasonable relation between the 12evil and the purported
cure or prevention offered by the regulation.
When this test is applied to zoning and nonzoning regulatory
ordinances, the regulation must be viewed in light of the desired result. Since the object of a zoning ordinance is primarily municipal
planning and future community development and is usually not aimed
at a specific tangible harm, the burden of showing it to be unreasonable is usually not as great as in attempting to prove the unreasonableness of a nonzoning regulatory ordinance enacted to protect
against some tangible harm.' 3
Where a nonzoning regulatory ordinance purports to destroy an
existing beneficial use of land, the question must be considered
whether such action is not in effect a taking of property without
compensation under the guise of the police power.' 4 The same prob9 "The validity of a law is to be determined by its purpose and its reason-

able and practical effect and operation, though enacted under the guise of some
general power, which the legislature may lawfully exercise, but which may be
and frequently is used in such a manner as to encroach, by design or otherwise,

upon the positive restraints of the Constitution." Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y.
577, 584, 32 N.E. 976, 977 (1893).
10 Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 N.Y. 115, 118, 89 N.E.2d 619, 620
(1949).
12See Armour v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 513 (1915); Sunny Slope
Water Co. v. City of Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 33 P.2d 672, 674 (1934). "Where
the suitability of plaintiff's
question, the court may not
lative body." Ulmer Park
1044, 1044-45, 63 N.Y.S.2d

property for residential use presents a debatable
substitute its judgment for that of the local legisRealty Co. v. City of New York, 270 App. Div.
143, 144 (2d Dep't 1946) (mem. opinion), aff'd

mciie., 297 N.Y. 788, 77 N.E.2d 797 (1948).
12 See Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425 (1902).
13 This point is clearly illustrated in Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 189
N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1959), where the defendant was granted a nonconforming use under the town zoning ordinance, but later was refused a nonconforming
use under a nonzoning regulatory ordinance enacted to protect the public against
the dangers of open excavations. See text accompanying note 77 infra for a
discussion of the Goldblatt case.
14 "The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 34

lem is raised under zoning legislation which attempts to prohibit
absolutely the beneficial use of land. In the next three sections an
attempt will be made to show in what instances zoning and nonzoning
regulatory ordinances have been upheld as reasonable and when they'
have been struck down as confiscatory. Both phases of the problem
will be considered, namely, regulation and prohibition of a business
or structure on the land and also regulation and prohibition of the
beneficial use of the land itself.
Regulation Under Zoning Ordinances
It is now well established that zoning ordinances may completely
exclude future businesses from a particular district. 15 However, as
in all such regulation, the ordinance must be reasonable as applied
to a particular case. In Vernon Park Realty, Inc. v. City of Mount
Vernon,16 the subject premises were in the middle of a zoned business
district, the land having theretofore been used as a parking lot. Subsequently, the land was zoned residential, following which the parking
of automobiles was continued as a valid nonconforming use. Later,
a variance was issued to permit the installation of a gasoline station.
The land was then sold to plaintiff, who unsuccessfully applied for a
variance to erect a shopping center, prohibited under the zoning ordinance. An action was brought and the ordinance as applied to plaintiff was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable, constituting an invasion
of property rights contrary to due process. The court reasoned that
the property in question was ideally situated for business use. Consequently, the restriction
imposed by the ordinance was unreasonable
7
and hence invalid.'
Again, in Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher,'s an ordinance
was enacted which zoned a certain area residential, although there
was little likelihood that the area would develop residential in the
near future. Plaintiff desired to erect a .asoline station on land
situated within the area affected by the ordinance. In an action to
secure a determination that the restrictions placed upon the use of
the land resulted in deprivation of property without due process of
law, the New York Court of Appeals held the ordinance invalid as
applied to the plaintiff's property. Here there was sufficient evidence
to show that the land could be put to no other profitable use, and
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). (Emphasis added.)
15 See Noel, sispra note 3, at 457.
16307 N.Y. 493, 121 N.E.2d 517 (1954).
17The court rejected the city's attempted justification of the ordinance on
the basis of an acute traffic problem. On this point the court said: "However
compelling and acute the community traffic problem may be, its solution does
not lie in placing an undue and uncompensated burden on the individual owner
of a single parcel of land in the guise of regulation, even for a public purpose."
Id. at 498, 121 N.E2d at 519.
18278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d 587 (1938).
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the hardship imposed on plaintiff was more than merely temporary.1
Consequently, the regulation constituted a taking without due process
of law.
Zoning regulations are often enacted which necessarily affect
the use of land itself. This is a necessary and legitimate exercise of
the police power, and when such legislation is reasonable and not
arbitrary it is usually upheld.20 It is frequently the case that a zoning
ordinance will prohibit the future use of land for a particular purpose.
In People v. Calvar Corp.21 defendants were convicted of violating
the building zone ordinance of the Town of Hempstead by using
for business purposes (excavation of sand and gravel) premises located in a residential zone. The ordinance did not absolutely prohibit such use of the land, but provision was made whereby a permit
might be obtained by compliance with certain regulations. The New
York Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the ordinance reasoning
that since the ordinance did not constitute a prohibition of the nonconforming use, but was in effect merely regulatory, it could not be
said to be unreasonable. 22
The court in Calvar expressed the opinion that forceful argument could be made that the difference between regulation and confiscation is merely one of degree, and when regulation goes too far
it constitutes a taking of property without compensation. The constitutionality of a general prohibition of a beneficial use of land has
not been passed on by the New York Court of Appeals and, in the
Calvar case, it expressly stated that it was an open question in New
York.2
Several lower court decisions in New York have indicated that
an absolute prohibition of the beneficial use of land will be declared
19 "The situation, of course, might be quite different where it appears that
within a reasonable time the property can be put to a profitable use. The
temporary inconvenience or even hardship of holding unproductive property
might then be compensated by ultimate benefit to the owners or, perhaps, even
without such compensation, the individual owner might be compelled to bear
a temporary burden in order to promote the public good." Id. at 232, 15 N.E.2d
at 592. See Rockdale Constr. Corp. v. Incorporated Village of Cedarhurst,
301 N.Y. 519, 93 N.E.2d 76 (1950) (memorandum decision), where a village
zoning ordinance limited the use of plaintiff's corner lots to residence purposes.
The lots fronted on a turnpike and a village street and were unadaptable for
residential use. The court struck down the ordinance as applied to plaintiff,
concluding that it destroyed the value of the property and thereby amounted to
a practical confiscation.
20 See People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644 (1941).
21286
N.Y. 419, 36 N.E2d 644 (1941).
22
Defendant could have applied for a temporary and conditional permit for
a period not to exceed five years for structures and uses in contravention of
the requirements of the ordinance. People v. Calvar Corp., supra note 20.
23 "Forceful argument may be made that a general and complete prohibition
of such use of property, even where such use might be permitted without causing substantial injury to the community, would be unreasonable. That question
must await determinationuntil it arises. We express no opinion on it." People
v. Calvar Corp., mpra note 20, at 421, 36 N.E.2d at 645. (Emphasis added.)

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 34

invalid. However, these decisions are of questionable authority and
have been limited and distinguished by later courts. 2 4 Nevertheless,
it would be well to consider them.
In Bartsch v. Ragonetti25 the court denied an injunction brought
to restrain the defendant from excavating sand on his property in
violation of a zoning ordinance. The court maintained that a municipality could only regulate the erection and use of structures on the
land and not the use of the land itself. However, such a limited view
of zoning regulation is not held today.2 6 The Ragonetti decision
2
was cited with favor in another case in 1924, People v. Linabury. 7
There the defendant appealed a conviction for violation of certain
zoning ordinances which restricted the use of the premises in question
to certain uses, such as the erection of dwelling houses, churches and
schools. The defendant was carrying on a wholesale sand business.
In holding that the ordinance was invalid as applied to the defendant
the court said:
A man cannot be prevented from taking from his property valuable material,
whether it be sand, minerals, or oil, without being duly compensated, and if,
as we must assume in this case, the sand in the lots is valuable property, the
zoning ordinance cannot arbitrarily deprive him of the right of taking it therefrom.

If the zoning ordinance prevented his taking the sand from the lot,

then he is being deprived of valuable property without compensation, in contravention of the Constitution.28
Approximately fourteen years later the question of the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance imposing an absolute prohibition on
the beneficial use of land again arose in Town of Harrison v. Sunny
Ridge Builders, Inc. 29

There an action was brought to enjoin the

defendant from removing topsoil from certain premises in violation
24 See People v. Calvar Corp., 286 N.Y. 419, 36 N.E.2d 644 (1941) ; People
v. Sessano, 29 N.Y.S.2d 45 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1941) ; People v. Susi, 23 N.Y.S.2d
812 (Magis. Ct. 1940).
25 123 Misc. 903, 207 N.Y. Supp. 142 (Sup. Ct. 1924), aff'd inem., 214 App.
Div. 799, 210 N.Y. Supp. 825 (2d Dep't 1925).
26 The Ragonetti decision, to the extent that it did not recognize the right
of the municipality to regulate the use of the land under a zoning ordinance,
may be considered overruled-characterized as "erroneous"-by the lower court

opinion in People v. Calvar, 69 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1941). However,
the court there considered that it did not know the answer if the statute
absolutely prohibited one from excavating. Id. at 280. See City of New
York v. Holzman, 71 N.Y.L.J. 1523 (1924), where the plaintiff sued to enjoin
the defendant from removing sand from certain lands on the ground that
the lands were situated in a residence district. The court refused the injunc-

tion stating that: "Sand is valuable property, and the owner of land upon
which there is sand or other valuable deposits cannot be prevented by the
action of the board of estimate, or even by the Legislature itself, from severing
and selling the same. To do so would be to deprive the owner of his property
without due process of law." Ibid.
27209 N.Y. Supp. 126 (County Ct. 1924).
28 Id. at 128-29.
29 170 Misc. 161, 8 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
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of the town zoning ordinance. The injunction was denied, the
court holding that the ordinance as applied here was not a valid
exercise of the police power. It seemed to imply, however, that if
there was evidence of a nuisance or some real danger, the ordinance
might have been upheld. The municipality had relied heavily on
the adverse effect the activity had upon the appearance of the
community.30
Courts in other jurisdictions have also been reluctant to uphold
zoning ordinances which absolutely prohibit the beneficial use of
land. In Pacific PalisadesAss'n v. City of Huntington Beach,3 ' an
ordinance was held to be arbitrary and unreasonable because it prohibited an owner from operating an oil well on his property while
in other districts of the city, more thickly populated and devoted to
residence purposes, such operations were permitted. Another instance where a prohibitory zoning ordinance was declared invalid
3 2
as applied was in Village of Terrace Park v. Errett.
There a zoning
ordinance established business and residence districts; the defendant
was the owner of a gravel business in a prohibited area. The court,
recognizing the substantial difference between an "ordinance prohibiting manufacturing or commercial business in a residential district that may be conducted in another locality with equal profit and
advantage, and an ordinance that wholly deprives the owner of its
valuable mineral content," 3 3 refused to uphold the ordinance as applied to the plaintiff.
It seems apparent from viewing the foregoing cases that courts
are reluctant to sanction an absolute prohibition of the beneficial use
of land under a zoning ordinance; the reason advanced is that the
indirect and somewhat speculative benefit accruing to the community
by virtue of zoning legislation is usually not sufficient to outweigh
the right of property owners to the beneficial use of their land.
Zoning ordinances must further be considered in light of the
existence of a nonconforming business, structure or use of the land.
For example, a zoning ordinance which prohibits all cemeteries in a
particular area zoned residential may be considered reasonable as to
all future cemeteries, but may be held invalid with respect to a ceme30 "The general proposition must still pertain, in spite of the serious incursions made upon it by recent legislation, that the owner of property has a
constitutional right to make any use of it that he desires so long as it does not
affect the safety, health, comfort or general welfare of the community." Id.
at 164, 8 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
3' 196 Cal. 211, 237 Pac. 538 (1925).
32 12 F.2d 240 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 710 (1926).
3 Id. at 243.
See also People v. Hawley, 207 Cal. 395, 279 Pac. 136 (1929),
where a zoning ordinance which prohibited excavating or dredging of any kind
within a particular residence district, except for construction purposes, was
held to impose an unreasonable restraint on the use by the defendant of its
property and an unwarranted interference with the right of the defendant to
carry on a lawful business. The court was influenced by the trial court's finding
that the operation of the defendant's business would not constitute a nuisance.
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tery in existence prior to the enactment of the ordinance. Similarly,
may a nonzoning regulatory ordinance, which prohibits the excavation of sand or gravel in the municipality because of possible danger
to the inhabitants, extinguish a pre-existing vested business interest
in the land where such interest depends on the use of the land itself?
In order to understand these problems better a brief discussion of the
nonconforming use is necessary.
The Nonconforming Use
The term nonconforming use describes a business, structure or
use of the land which existed prior to the enactment of the zoning
ordinance and which does not conform to the terms of the ordinance.
Originally it was thought that a zoning regulation to be valid must
operate prospectively, especially where there was a sufficient business
interest to be protected. 34 Consequently, because few were willing to
test the constitutionality of their zoning plans by inserting retroactive
provisions, a nonconforming use was usually not disturbed. 35 Moreover, it was generally felt that such nonconforming uses would be
gradually eliminated. 6 The opposite result occurred, however; nonconforming uses flourished in a monopolistic atmosphere
created by
3 7
the granting of this immunity from regulation.
As a consequence, instances began to occur where zoning regulations were enacted to prohibit the continuation of nonconforming
uses. The question naturally arose whether such regulation did not
in effect destroy existing property rights without due process of law.
In Fox Lane Corp. v. Mann 88 a permit was necessary under the
Building Zone Resolution for the construction of the building in
question. Respondent had obtained a permit; subsequently, the resolution was amended thereby dissolving the permit. In an action
brought to compel the re-issuance of the permit, the New York Court
of Appeals affirmed the holding that "the expenditures made and
34 See Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 304, 295 Pac. 14 (1930),
where the invalidity of retroactive zoning was supposedly established in California. There, a zoning ordinance was enacted which provided that no sanitarium could thereafter be operated in certain specified areas reserved for
residential construction and use. At the time there were several sanitariums
already existing and in operation in the area. The California Supreme Court
refused to enforce the ordinance and stated: "We are asked to uphold a
municipal ordinance which destroys valuable businesses, built up over a period
of years .... Only a paramount and compelling public necessity could sanction so extraordinary an interference with useful business." Id. at 314, 295
Pac. at 19. But see City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274
P.2d 34 (2d Dist. 1954).
35
See 53 MIcH. L. Rzrv. 762, 764 (1955).
36
See 53 MIcH. L. REv. 762 (1955).
37 Ibid. "There islittle
hope that such uses will disappear by themselves
where the nonconforming use enjoys a monopolistic advantage, protected from
further invasion by the zoning ordinance." Id. at 763.
38 243 N.Y. 550, 154 N.E. 600 (memorandum decision).
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obligations incurred by the respondent in reliance upon the permit in
question were insufficient to give it a vested right to erect the building.., in violation of the amendment." 3
Citing the Fox Lane case with favor, the New York Court of
Appeals decided the case of People v. Miller.40 There the defendant
was engaged in the hobby of raising pigeons. Subsequently, a zoning
law was enacted prohibiting such use of the property in question.
The defendant claimed that his pre-existing use of the premises rendered the regulation unenforceable against him. The ordinance was
upheld as valid, the court stating:
In this state, then, existing nonconforming uses will be permitted to continue,
despite the enactment of a prohibitory zoning ordinance, if, and only if, enforcement of the ordinance would, by rendering valueless substantial improvements or businesses built up over the years, cause serious financial harm to
the property owner. 41

The court was of the opinion that pigeon raising was a mere
hobby and such incidental use of the land did not warrant striking
down the ordinance in question. 42 The rationale underlying the
Miller rule as set forth by that court is as follows:
The destruction of substantial businesses or structures developed or built prior
to the adoption of a zoning ordinance is not deemed to be balanced or justified
by the advantage to the public, in terms of43more complete and effective zoning,
accruing from the cessation of such uses.
Because of these and other decisions it was generally believed

that zoning ordinances prohibiting further operation of a nonconforming use would be struck down as unreasonable by the New York
courts where a substantial investment had been made or structure
built. Several other jurisdictions, however, in order to provide for
the eventual elimination of undesirable nonconforming uses, employed
a method known as amortization. 44 Amortization is achieved by
39216 App. Div. 813, 215 N.Y. Supp. 334 (2d Dep't) (per curiam), aff'd

nem., 243 N.Y. 550, 154 N.E. 600 (1926).

40304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952).
41 Id. at 109, 106 N.E.2d at 36. See Barkman v. Town of Hempstead, 268
App. Div. 785 (2d Dep't 1944) (memorandum decision), aff'd mere., 294 N.Y.
805 (1945), where an ordinance similar to the ordinance in the Miller case
was4 2upheld.
People v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E2d 34 (1952). "This rule, with
its emphasis upon pecuniary and economic loss, is clearly inapplicable to a
purely incidental use of property for recreational or amusement purposes only."
Id. at 109, 106 N.E2d at 36. In People ex rel. Ortenberg v. Bales, 224 App.
Div. 87, 229 N.Y. Supp. 550 (2d Dep't 1928), aff'd mene., 250 N.Y. 598, 160
N.E. 339 (1929), a builder who had received a permit and made substantial
excavations on the land was deemed to have a vested right which could not
be destroyed by a subsequent change in a zoning regulation.
43 People v. Miller, swpra note 42, at 108, 106 N.E.2d at 35. See also Noel,
Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 CoLum. L. Rnv. 457, 458-59 (1941).
44 Reasonable fixed periods of amortization have been upheld in Standard
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providing in the ordinance for the discontinuance of the nonconforming use within a prescribed time. Thus, while an order for the
immediate elimination of a substantial interest would often be held
use within a reasonable
invalid, amortization of a nonconforming
45
period of time has been upheld.

In 1958 the New York Court of Appeals in Harbison v. City
of Buffalo-40 was asked to pass on the validity of a city ordinance
which required the termination of the nonconforming use of certain
47
The City of Buffalo
premises as a junk yard within three years.
but rather on several
theory
the
nuisance
did not base its claim on
decisions from other jurisdictions which had sustained ordinances
48
In reversing and recontaining reasonable amortization periods.
manding the case, the court stated that the lower courts had not
"considered the question of whether the particular period prescribed
by the ordinance was reasonable under the facts of the case." 49 Thus,
while the lower courts here had categorically rejected an amortization period as being at odds with the New York rule as set forth
in the Miller case, the Court of Appeals reasoned that such a provision was merely one more factor to be considered in determining

Oil Co. v. City of Tallahassee, 183 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
892 (1950) (a gasoline service station required to be eliminated in ten years) ;
Spurgeon v. Board of Comm'rs, 181 Kan. 1008, 317 P.2d 798 (1957) (automobile wrecking business required to be removed within two years) ; State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929) (grocery
store to be eliminated in one year) ; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby,

168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) (drug store to be eliminated in one year).
But see City of Akron v. Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953)

(amortization of junk business within a "reasonable" time held invalid).
45 See, e.g., cases cited note 44 supra.
46 4 N.Y.2d 553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958).
47
The pertinent section of the ordinance as quoted by the Court of Appeals
reads substantially as follows:
"1. Continuing existing uses:
Except as provided in this section, any non-conforming use of any building,
structure, land or premises may be continued. Provided, however, that on
premises situate in any 'R' district each use which is not a conforming use in
the 'RS' district and which falls into one of the categories hereinafter enumerated shall cease or shall be changed to a conforming use within 3 years
from the effective date of this amended chapter. The requirements of this
subdivision for the termination of non-conforming uses shall apply in each
of the following cases:
(d) Any junk yard." Id. at 556-57, 152 N.E.2d at 43, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 600.
See note 44 smpra. The Appellate Division had stated in holding the
amortization provision invalid: "Whatever the law may be in California or
Florida or other jurisdictions, in this State, the rule is as stated in People v.
Miller . . . to wit: 'It is the law of this state that nonconforming uses or
structures, in existence when a zoning ordinance is enacted, are, as a general
rule, constitutionally protected and will be permitted to continue, notwithHarbison v. City of
standing the contrary provisions of the ordinance.'"
Buffalo, 4 App. Div. 2d 999, 169 N.Y.S.2d 598 (4th Dep't 1957) (per curiam).
49Harbison v. City of Buffalo, supra note 46, at 563, 152 N.E.2d at 47,
176 N.Y.S2d at 605.
48
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if the ordinance in question was reasonable as applied to a particular
set of facts. 0
The rule of the Harbison case is to apply both to structures 51
and to uses. 2 It is submitted that this method for the gradual elimination of nonconforming uses is perhaps the most equitable that can
be employed. But, since it imposes severe restrictions on vested
property rights, any such provision should be subjected to the closest
judicial scrutiny.
From the foregoing it can be seen that comprehensive zoning
regulation must operate prospectively where it might affect substantial business interests, unless a reasonable period of amortization is
provided. This limitation to prospective operation does not exist,
however, under nonzoning regulatory ordinances enacted for the public health and safety. Here the evil usually consists of some tangible
harm to the community,5 3 and consequently, only measures which
may operate on existing conditions so as to regulate and, if necessary, to prohibit a presently existing danger would be effective.
Thus, a regulation requiring fire escapes on all buildings may
include within its purview not only buildings to be erected in the
future but also those presently standing. The danger of fire, the basis
for the regulation, is of course not restricted to structures to be
50 "When the termination provisions are reasonable in the light of the nature
of the business of the property owner, the improvements erected on the land,

the character of the neighborhood, and the detriment caused the property
owner, we may not hold them constitutionally invalid." Id. at 562-63, 152
N.E.2d at 47, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 605. Two judges concurred, indicating that the
rule in the Miller case encompasses this concept of reasonable amortization.
51 "With regard to prior nonconforming structures, reasonable termination
periods based upon the amortized life of the structure are not, in our opinion,
unconstitutional." Id. at 561, 152 N.E.2d at 46, 176 N.Y.S.2d at 604.
52 "To enunciate a contrary rule would mean that the use of land for such
purposes as a tennis court, an open air skating rink, a junk yard or a parking
lot-readily transferable to another site-at the date of the enactment of a
zoning ordinance vests the owner thereof with the right to utilize the land in
that manner in perpetuity . . . ." Id. at 562, 152 N.E2d at 47, 176 N.Y.S.2d
at 605 (emphasis added). It seems significant that the court does not allude
to a situation where a use of the land constitutes a use of the natural resources
to be found thereon. Also the court cites here with seeming approval, Town
of Somers v. Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955), where defendant
conducted a nonconforming sand and gravel business under a zoning ordinance
providing for such nonconforming use. Subsequently the ordinance was amended
whereby such protection no longer applied. The court held the ordinance
invalid as unreasonably depriving defendant of a vested right. Quaere: What
constitutes a "reasonable" period of amortization for a nonconforming use
which is dependent for its very existence upon the resources of a particular

piece of land?

53 See Noel, Retroactive Zoning and Nuisances, 41 CoLum. L. REv. 457
(1941). "[I]n almost all of the cases where legislation of this kind has been
sustained, the enterprise prohibited has been of a type causing a tangible kind
of harm, such as an invasion of the atmosphere with soot, or odors, or
noise... ." Id. at 464.
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built in the future.54 Under this type of regulation where there is a
present or future danger which constitutes a real and serious threat
to the public health and safety, unreasonableness is much more difficult to prove, and the burden on the one attacking such an ordinance
is greater. In the next section the effects of nonzoning regulatory
ordinances on businesses and structures on the land and also on the
beneficial use of land itself will be analyzed.
Nonioning Regulatory Ordinances
As was stated previously, the municipality may enact reasonable
regulations to protect and promote the public health, welfare and
safety. As will be seen, unlike zoning regulation, the nonzoning
regulatory ordinance has been upheld even where it resulted in an
absolute prohibition of a substantial business on the land, the test
being whether the destruction of valuable property rights was deemed
necessary by the legislature for the protection of the public health
and safety.
In Reinnman v. City of Little Rock,5 5 an ordinance was enacted
which made it unlawful to conduct a livery stable in certain defined
portions of the city. The petitioner contended that the operation of
a livery stable did not constitute a nuisance per se and consequently
could not be prohibited by such an ordinance. The Supreme Court
rejected this contention:
Granting that it is not a nuisance per se, it is clearly within the police power
of the State to regulate the business and to that end to declare that in particular

circumstances and in particular localities a livery stable shall be deemed a
nuisance in fact and in law, provided this power is not exerted arbitrarily, or
with unjust discrimination, so as to infringe upon rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 56

Citing the Reininan case with favor, the Supreme Court decided
Hadacheck v. Sebastian.57 In that case a Los Angeles ordinance
was enacted prohibiting the establishment or operation of a brick
yard or brick kiln within described limits in the city. Plaintiff in
error was convicted of a violation of the ordinance. He claimed that
the ordinance, if declared valid, would compel him to entirely abandon
his business and would deprive him of the use of his property, and
that the prohibition, therefore, constituted a taking without compensa5

4See Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Saxl, 328 U.S. 80 (1946).

See also

Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237
U.S. 171 (1915); Engelsher v. Jacobs, 5 N.Y.2d 370, 157 N.E.2d 626, 184
N.Y.S.2d 640, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959); Town of N. Hempstead v.
Colonial Sand and Stone Co., 14 Misc. 2d 727, 178 N.Y.S.2d 579 (Sup. Ct.
1958).
55237 U.S. 171 (1915).
5o

Id. at 176.

57239 U.S. 394 (1915).
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tion. The Court rejected these contentions and upheld the validity
of the ordinance in a carefully worded opinion. It distinguished between a prohibition of the manufacturing of bricks on the land and a
prohibition of the removal of the clay itself.5" The Court maintained
tha:t although the removal of clay to some other locale for manufacturing purposes might be financially prohibitive, it was not a sufficient
reason for striking down the ordinance since it did not constitute a
physical impossibility. 9
It would seem, therefore, that a nonconforming business interest
or structure, which in the eyes of the legislature presents a tangible
harm to the community, may be absolutely prohibited from further
operation if the prohibition does not destroy completely the beneficial
use of the land.
A different problem arises where a nonzoning regulatory ordinance is aimed at the regulation or prohibition of the beneficial use
of the land itself. While most businesses may be carried on in various localities, a business, the very essence of which depends upon
the natural resources of the business situs, obviously cannot be
moved.
Conceding that reasonable regulations may be imposed, do not
ordinances which result in the absolute prohibition of the beneficial
use of land go beyond mere regulation and constitute a taking of
property without due process of law? There are opinions to support
both sides of the question. Each decision must necessarily rest on
its own facts since general rules in this area appear difficult of
formulation.
Where there is an actual danger constituting a nuisance, prohibition will often be upheld. However, where the use is not dangerous
per se but may become so by inadequate protection or faulty operation the decision usually rests on the imminence of the danger and
the degree of destruction of the profitable use of the land. In Ex parte
58 Several other cases have been decided which have entirely prohibited
various businesses or structures on the land because they were deemed to constitute a danger to the public health, safety or morals. See, e.g., Pierce Oil
Corp. v. City of Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919) (prohibition of oil tanks);
Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912) (prohibition of billiard hall);
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888) (prohibition of oleomargarine
factory); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (prohibition of brewery).
Note, however, that none of these cases deprive the property owner of all beneficial use of his land.
Although the Reininan case appears more extreme on its face since all
present use was prohibited, the Court in Hadacheck in fact extended the
Reinmaan holding by prohibiting a use which was economically inseparable from
the property. Separation of the brick kiln from its source of raw material
necessarily resulted in a termination of the business and retention of the right
to extract clay became valueless. This was not the case in Reinnnan where the
livery
stable could be conducted in another locale.
5
It is well established that mere financial difficulty in complying with the
provisions of a police power regulation will not of itself render the ordinance
invalid. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, saprc note 57.
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Kelso 60 the California court declared invalid an ordinance absolutely
prohibiting the maintenance or operation of a rock quarry within a
certain portion of San Francisco. The court stated that the removal
could be regulated but that "an absolute prohibition of such removal
under the circumstances could not be upheld." 61 Some time later in
the Hadacheck case 62 the Supreme Court commented on this problem but expressly reserved any opinion on it.63
Perhaps the landmark decision in the area of absolute prohibition is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 64 Although not completely
solving the problem, the decision demonstrated that, at least in certain instances, an ordinance which absolutely prohibits the only beneficial use of land will be declared invalid as a taking of property
without due process of law. The coal company had deeded land to
the defendant in error, which deed conveyed the surface of the land
but in express terms reserved the right to mine all the coal under
the surface. The grantee waived all claim for damages that might
arise from mining the coal. Subsequently, a Pennsylvania statute
was passed which forbade the mining of coal in such a way as to
cause the subsidence of, among other things, any structure used as a
human habitation. In holding the statute invalid as applied to the
plaintiffs, the Court set forth a basic test for determining when regulation becomes confiscation.
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the
police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its limits, or
the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in
determining such limits is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there 5must be an exercise of
eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.6
Concerning the landowner's claim that the statute might have
been justified as a protection of personal safety, the Court was of
the opinion that this could be provided for by notice of intention to
mine under the house. Thus, even though there was a positive element of danger here the Court did not feel that this warranted the
total destruction of a valuable estate in land when protection might
be provided for by means less stringent than absolute prohibition. 6
147 Cal. 609, 82 Pac. 241 (1905).
61 Id. at -, 82 Pac. at 242.
See text accompanying note 57 supra.
62239 U.S. 394 (1915).
63 "In the present case there is no prohibition of the removal of the brick
clay; only a prohibition within the designated locality of its manufacture into
bricks. And to this feature of the ordinance our opinion is addressed. Whether
other questions wodd arise if the ordinance were broader, and opinion on such
questions, we reserve." Id. at 412. (Emphasis added.)
64260 U.S. 393 (1922).
65 Id. at 413. (Emphasis added.)
66 It has been contended that the Court's decision in the Pennsylvania Coal
case rested primarily on the reserved right to mine the coal in as much as an
absolute prohibition of the mining of the coal would destroy existing contract
rights. However, the court in Village of Terrace Park v. Errett, 12 F.2d
60
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It would seem, therefore, that the Pennsylvania Coal Company
decision is strong authority for the proposition that an ordinance,
whether zoning or nonzoning regulatory, which absolutely prohibits
the only beneficial use of land does not come within the purview of
the police power but constitutes a taking of valuable property rights
without compensation. Several decisions have been handed down,
however, which appear somewhat contrary to the Pennsylvania Coal
case.
In Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles67 an ordinance
was enacted which included land on which oil drilling operations were
contemplated. As a result the beneficial use to which the property
owner was putting his land had now become unlawful. The Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that the appellant's land was oil-bearing
land, and that the ordinance preventing him from drilling thereon
had in effect destroyed the value of the property in that respect.
Nevertheless, the court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable exercise
of the police power basing its decision to a great extent on the findings of the trial court, which indicated clearly that the further operation of oil wells on the property would have created a nuisance. 6s
A vigorous dissent in the Marblehead Land Co. decision developed two very important points, namely, that "the city has not
attempted by reasonable regulations to accomplish what it seeks by
the absolute prohibition, and thus to preserve a measure, at least, of
the value of the property right which it would wholly destroy." 69
The dissent stated further that "differing from most of the cases
where such controversy has arisen, the ordinance under consideration
affects the inherent value of a natural resource which can be utilized
only upon the ground." 70
240 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 710 (1926), in an excellent analysis,
answers this contention in the following manner:
"rI]t is sufficient to say that a reservation in a deed does not create title
or enlarge the vested rights of a grantor, but merely reserves the specific
interest named therein from the operation of the grant. The owner of a
fee-simple estate in land has the same vested interest and property rights in
the minerals in or underlying the land as an owner who has executed a deed
to the surface, reserving the minerals. In either case, the same rule applies
in determining whether an ordinance is regulatory in its nature, or amounts to
a taking of private property without compensation." Id. at 241.
67 Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 284 U.S. 634 (1931).
Os The trial court made certain findings of fact concerning fumes and odors,
the creation of a fire hazard, and the depreciation of local property values.
Id. at 530. The court was also influenced by the fact that the value of the
land in question was worth approximately $10,000 per acre. Id. at 529. The
case was distinguishable from the Pennsylvania Coal case where the land had
only one beneficial use-the mining of coal-and where the Court felt that any
danger could be foreclosed by notice.
69 d. at 537 (dissenting opinion).
70 Ibid. The dissent cited with favor the dictum in Hadacheck and the
E. Porte Kelso, and Village of Terrace Park decisions and concluded: "With
reasonable regulations the operation may be continued without substantial in-
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Two New York cases have also upheld the validity of nonzoning
regulatory ordinances prohibiting the beneficial use of land. In Lizza
& Sons, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead 71 the three Nassau County
towns of Hempstead, North Hempstead and Oyster Bay enacted
uniform ordinances regulating the removal of top soil. A second
ordinance subsequently replaced the first and was so severe in its
terms as to render the plaintiffs' excavating operation impractical
and thus prohibitory. The court acknowledged that the New York
Court of Appeals had never passed on the question of whether the
state or its subdivisions has the right to prohibit absolutely the removal of topsoil. Nevertheless, the validity of the ordinance was
upheld; the decision based on two factors, namely that the top soil
problem on Long Island was very acute and necessitated extreme
regulation, 72 and, secondly, that the prohibition of the removal of
top soil affected only a small part of the plaintiffs' over-all business and
did not impose a prohibition on all beneficial uses of the land.7 3 Thus,
where the ordinance does not preclude the property owner from making at feast some beneficial use of his land, and where there is some
tangible danger to protect against, the prohibition may be upheld as
valid.
In Post Brick Co. v. Thompson 74 an ordinance was enacted
which precluded the plaintiff from excavating clay for business purposes. The plaintiff contended that the ordinance was arbitrary and
based on purely aesthetic conditions; that the objection to the excavations of clay was not that life and health might have been endangered,
but that the vista or outlook of some property owners might have
been impaired. Rejecting these claims the court held that such prohibition was not an unreasonable exercise of the police power since
"the deep excavations . . . are filled with water, and on the face
thereof constitute hazards which amount to public nuisances." 75
jury or menace to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, and
under such circumstances an absolute prohibition is thought to be arbitrary
and unwarranted." Id. at 538.
7169 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1946), aff'd inem., 272 App. Div. 921, 71
N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1947).
72 "Certainly, if top soil removal or stripping may be prohibited anywhere
in the State, it should be lawful to prohibit it on Long Island where top soil
is naturally extremely thin." Id. at 299.
73 "All the plaintiffs are general contractors; none of them will be prevented
by this ordinance from carrying on their ordinary business, of which the sale
of topsoil forms only a part." Id. at 300. Compare Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), where the Supreme Court recognized that the
plaintiff's only use of the land in question was limited to coal mining.
74 68 N.Y.S.2d 159 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
75/d. at 161. This case demonstrates the impracticability of attempting to
separate into two distinct classes zoning ordinances and nonzoning regulatory
ordinances. On the one hand the plaintiff is claiming that the ordinance has
been enacted primarily for aesthetic considerations. The court on the other
hand concludes that the possible danger from a nuisance is sufficient reason
for exercising the police power. In many such cases both types of ordinances
are so interrelated as to be almost incapable of separation.
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Here, again, there was evidence of a tangible harm to the community
which the court felt justified such regulation.
It should be remembered that when the municipality wishes to
take land for the public good it must render compensation therefor."
Merely because the legislature deems that the public health and safety
require that certain regulations be imposed, this does not mean, ipso
facto, that such regulation is a legitimate exercise of the police power.
If the regulation is such that the property owner is deprived of all
profitable or beneficial use of his land, has not that land in fact been
confiscated without due process of law?
The question of the constitutionality of an absolute prohibition
on the beneficial use of land has recently been raised in a New York
Supreme Court case, Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt.7
The Goldblatt Case-A PracticalProhibition?
Since 1927 defendant had conducted a sand gravel business on
water-filled property thirty-eight acres in size. On April 9, 1956, on
the strength of his substantial operation of the sand pit prior to the
enactment of the ordinance, defendant had obtained a judicially declared nonconforming use notwithstanding the town zoning ordinance.78 In 1945 Ordinance No. 16 of the Town of Hempstead
was enacted and subsequently amended in 1958. 79 In 1959 the defendant was convicted of a violation of this ordinance; an injunction
issued restraining further operation of the sandpit until all the regulations had been complied with.
The court clearly distinguished between the town zoning ordinance under which the defendant had been granted a nonconforming
use and Ordinance No. 16 by which the town "regulates uses regardless of locations or zones under its governmental police powers
for 'the safety, health and general welfare of the people of the
Town' ....
-80
One of the 1958 amendments to Ordinance No. 16 is Article
I, section 4, subdivision H which states that "No excavation shall
be made below two feet above the maximum ground water level at
the site." 81 The defendant contended that as applied to him the
76 "The constitutional prohibition against taking property for public use
without compensation, applies to injury and destruction as well as to appropriation .... ." FREUND, THE POLICE PowER § 511 (1904).
7 189 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
78 Id. at 582. The judgment granting the nonconforming use under the
zoning ordinance was entered on April 9, 1956 on the strength of People
v. Miller, 304 N.Y. 105, 106 N.E.2d 34 (1952), and Town of Somers v.
Camarco, 308 N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955). See note 52 and text accompanying note 41 supra.
79 See Record, pp. 10-13, for the new version of the ordinance.
80
Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, 189 N.Y.S.2d 577 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
s Record, pp. 10, 12-13.
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ordinance was confiscatory since he had been dredging for sand and
gravel below the water level for approximately thirty years. He also
contended that if the ordinance were enforced it would result in an
absolute prohibition of the beneficial use of the land.8 2 Rejecting
this contention, along with several others, the court upheld the ordinance as a reasonable exercise of the police power, stating that there
was nothing in the evidence to show that the defendant could not
conform to the ordinance or what it would cost if he attempted to
conform.83 The court in dicta stated that even if the defendant had
established that the enforcement of the ordinance resulted in a practical prohibition "it would not be of assistance to them in this case
where the danger to the public safety and welfare is a real and serious
one." 84 Thus, the court indicates that where there is a real danger
to the community, an ordinance absolutely prohibiting the beneficial
use of land is a valid exercise of the police power. It is questionable,
however, whether the cases cited in support of this proposition are
controlling authority.8 5
The Court in the Hadacheck case, while upholding an absolute
prohibition of a business on the land, had expressly reserved opinion
as to the validity of an absolute prohibition of the use of the land
itself.80 The ordinance in People v. Gerus had made provision for
the obtaining of a permit under which excavation could be lawfully
continued.8 7 Consequently, the ordinance did not absolutely prohibit
but merely regulated the use of land. The case of Lizza & Sons v.
Town of Hempstead is perhaps the strongest authority cited. There
the court, while conceding that the New York Court of Appeals has
not as yet passed on the validity of an absolute prohibition of the use
of land,88 nevertheless, upheld certain ordinances absolutely prohibiting the removal of topsoil. Stating that "these ordinances are a reasonable exercise of the police power and do not prevent a beneficial
use of land beyond the modest limitations imposed by the statute," 89
the court seems to infer that the prohibition did not destroy all beneficial use of the land, but was at most a partial prohibition. It is
doubtful, however, that this reasoning can be applied to the situation
82

In his motion to dismiss, the attorney for the defendant stated: "The

practical effect of that application, Judge, is to tell us to put a padlock on our
door, because I tell your Honor now we cannot dig one more barrel of sand,

except maybe on one or two of the berms, and we are out of business if that

is put against us. I say on a constitutional basis it would be confiscation
of our property without just compensation." Id. at 223.
83 Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, supra note 80.
8
4 Town of Hempstead v. Goldblatt, supra note 80, at 586.
85 The court cites as authority Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 171 (1915);
Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 69 N.Y.S.2d 296 (Sup. Ct. 1946),
aff'd mere., 272 App. Div. 921, 71 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1947); People v.

Gerus, 69 N.Y.S.2d 283 (County Ct. 1942).
s8 See text accompanying note 58 supra.
87 See People v. Gerus, supra note 85, at 288.

88 See Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, supra note 85, at 299.
89 See Lizza & Sons, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, szura note 85, at 300.
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in Goldblatt. The land in question here consists of a sprawling,
water-filled excavation, and it might prove extremely difficult to put
it to some other profitable use. This ordinance, therefore, seems
to have rendered the defendant's property useless if in fact he cannot
conform. Also, the presence of danger to the community from the
excavation does not necessarily justify an absolute prohibition. This
is well illustrated by the Pennsylvania Coal decision where the danger
from mining was held not to warrant the destruction of valuable
property rights."°
If the defendant had been able to prove to the court that the
ordinance in question made it impossible for him to carry on further
excavation and that the land could be put to no other beneficial use,
then notwithstanding the presence of some "real and serious danger,"
it would seem that the ordinance was not merely regulatory but was
in fact confiscatory, an attempt to do under the police power that
which should be accomplished under the power of eminent domain.
Conclusion
The police power is the most limitless of all governmental powers
and any regulation under this power must be upheld absent a showing that the ordinance is unreasonable and arbitrary as applied to a
particular set of circumstances. Zoning regulation may validly regulate future uses of the land as long as the owner is not deprived of
every beneficial use thereof. Where there is no substantial business
interest to be protected, a zoning ordinance may operate on existing
conditions and prohibit a nonconforming use. However, where such
nonconforming use constitutes a substantial interest, it can only be
eliminated by a reasonable period of amortization. What is a reasonable period must be determined according to the facts of each particular case. It is submitted that the courts should subject such provisions
requiring amortization of nonconforming uses to close judicial scrutiny because of the possibility of abuse in this area.
Nonzoning regulatory ordinances may be validly employed not
only to regulate but, if necessary, to prohibit nonconforming businesses and structures on the land since there is usually some tangible
danger to protect against. Regulation of the use of the land itself
where such regulation is reasonable has also been upheld. However,
the law has not as yet been clearly defined where ordinances prohibit, either expressly or practically, the beneficial use of land. Here
a constitutional question is raised since under the reasoning of the
Pennsylvania Coal case it would seem that when all beneficial use
of land is prohibited, the ordinance ceases to be regulatory and becomes a taking without due process of law. In such an instance the
power of eminent domain should be exercised and compensation
90 See text accompanying note 66 .supra.
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rendered for the destruction of valuable property rights even if the
public health and safety justifies such interference. 9'

91 "The protection of private property in the Fifth Amendment presupposes
that it is wanted for public use, but provides that it shall not be taken for
such use without compensation. A similar assumption is made in the decisions
upon the Fourteenth Amendment. .

.

. When this seemingly absolute protec-

tion is found to be qualified by the police power, the natural tendency of human
nature is to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears. But that cannot be accomplished in this way under the Constitution of the United States." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922).

